

# Competitive Equilibria: Uniqueness and Stability

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Microeconomic Theory

Lecture 7

# Questions

- Is Competitive/Walrasian equilibrium unique?
- Why is a unique equilibrium helpful?
- If WE is not unique, how many WE can be there?
- What are the conditions, for a unique WE?
- Do these conditions hold in the real world?
- Is Competitive/Walrasian equilibrium stable?
- Why is stability of an equilibrium important?

Background Readings:

Arrow and Hahn. (1971), Jehle and Reny\* (2008), MWG\*(1995)

# Multiple WE: Example

## Example

From MWG\*(1995): Two consumers:

- $u^1(.) = x_1^1 - \frac{1}{8} \frac{1}{(x_2^1)^8}$  and  $u^2(.) = -\frac{1}{8} \frac{1}{(x_1^2)^8} + x_2^2$
- $e^1 = (2, r)$  and  $e^2 = (r, 2)$ ;  $r = 2^{\frac{8}{9}} - 2^{\frac{1}{9}}$
- The equilibria are solution to

$$\left(\frac{p_2}{p_1}\right)^{-\frac{1}{9}} + 2 + r \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1}\right) - \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1}\right)^{\frac{8}{9}} = 2 + r, i.e.,$$

there are three equilibria:

$$\frac{p_2}{p_1} = \frac{1}{2}, 1, \text{ and } 2.$$

# Unique WE: Conditions I

Consider  $2 \times 2$  economy:

- Two goods: food and cloth
- Let  $(p_f, p_c)$  be the price vector.
- We know that for all  $t > 0$ :  $\mathbf{z}(t\mathbf{p}) = \mathbf{z}(\mathbf{p})$ .
- Therefore, we can work with

$$\mathbf{p} = \left(\frac{p_f}{p_c}, 1\right) = (p, 1).$$

From Walras's Law, we have  $p z_f(\mathbf{p}) + z_c(\mathbf{p}) = 0$ . That is,

$$z_f(\mathbf{p}) = 0 \Leftrightarrow z_c(\mathbf{p}) = 0$$

When utility functions are continuous, strongly monotonic and strictly quasi-concave:

# Unique WE: Conditions II

- $z_i(\mathbf{p})$  is continuous for all  $\mathbf{p} \gg \mathbf{p}$ , i.e., for all  $p > 0$ .
- there exists small  $p = \epsilon > 0$  s.t.  $z_f(\epsilon, 1) > 0$ , and
- there exists another  $p' > \frac{1}{\epsilon}$  s.t.  $z_c(p', 1) > 0$ .

## Question


- *Do the above assumptions guarantee unique WE?*
- *Under what conditions the WE be unique?*

An additional assumption can ensure uniqueness of WE:

- $z'_f(\mathbf{p}) < 0$  for all  $p > 0$ .

# Uniqueness of Equilibrium: $2 \times 2$ Economy

Do the above assumptions on utility functions ensure  $z'_f(\mathbf{p}) < 0$  for all  $p > 0$ ?



# Normal Goods and Number of Equilibria I

Let,

- there be two goods - food and cloth.
- $\mathbf{e}^1 = (e_f^1, e_c^1)$  and  $\mathbf{e}^2 = (e_f^2, e_c^2)$  be the initial endowment vectors
- $\mathbf{p} = (p, 1)$  be a price vector.

Assumption: Assume utility functions to be

- continuous, strongly monotonic and strictly quasi-concave

From Walras Law we have  $\mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{z}(\mathbf{p}) = 0$ , i.e.,

$$pz_f(\mathbf{p}) + z_c(\mathbf{p}) = 0.$$

By definition:

$$\begin{aligned} z_f(\mathbf{p}) &= z_f^1(\mathbf{p}) + z_f^2(\mathbf{p}) \\ &= [x_f^1(\mathbf{p}) - e_f^1] + [x_f^2(\mathbf{p}) - e_f^2] \end{aligned}$$

# Normal Goods and Number of Equilibria II

- Let  $\mathbf{p}^*$  denote an equilibrium price vector.
- We know that for the above economy at least one  $\mathbf{p}^*$  exists. Why?

Let

- $I^1(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{e}^1) = \mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{e}^1 = p e_f^1 + e_c^1$
- $I^2(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{e}^2) = \mathbf{p} \cdot \mathbf{e}^2 = p e_f^2 + e_c^2$

Note

$$\underbrace{\frac{dz_f(\mathbf{p})}{dp}}_{\text{Price effect (total)}} = \underbrace{\frac{dz_f^1(\mathbf{p})}{dp}}_{\text{Price effect (total)}} + \underbrace{\frac{dz_f^2(\mathbf{p})}{dp}}_{\text{Price effect (total)}}$$



# Normal Goods and Number of Equilibria III

Since endowments are fixed, we get

$$\underbrace{\frac{dz_f(\mathbf{p})}{dp}}_{\text{Price effect (total)}} = \left( \frac{\partial x_f^1(\mathbf{p})}{\partial p} \right)_{du^1=0} - (x_f^1(\mathbf{p}) - e_f^1) \left( \frac{\partial x_f^1(\mathbf{p})}{\partial p^1} \right) + \left( \frac{\partial x_f^2(\mathbf{p})}{\partial p} \right)_{du^2=0} - (x_f^2(\mathbf{p}) - e_f^2) \left( \frac{\partial x_f^2(\mathbf{p})}{\partial p^2} \right) \quad (1)$$

# Normal Goods and Number of Equilibria IV

WLOG assume that

- in equilibrium (at  $\mathbf{p}^*$ ). Person 1 is net buyer of food; i.e.,  $x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*) - e_f^1 > 0$ .
- In equi. (food) market clears. So,

$$x_f^2(\mathbf{p}^*) - e_f^2 = -[x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*) - e_f^1].$$

At equilibrium price,  $\mathbf{p}^*$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial z_f(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p} &= \left( \frac{\partial x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p} \right)_{du^1=0} - (x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*) - e_f^1) \left( \frac{\partial x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p^1} \right) \\ &+ \left( \frac{\partial x_f^2(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p} \right)_{du^2=0} - (x_f^2(\mathbf{p}^*) - e_f^2) \left( \frac{\partial x_f^2(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p^2} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

We can rearrange (2) to get

## Normal Goods and Number of Equilibria V

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial z_f(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p} &= \left( \frac{\partial x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p} \right)_{du^1=0} + \left( \frac{\partial x_f^2(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p} \right)_{du^1=0} \\ &+ (x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*) - e_f^1) \left( \frac{\partial x_f^2(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p^2} - \frac{\partial x_f^1(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p^1} \right),\end{aligned}$$

Now, even if both goods are normal,

- Person 2 might have large income effect that can offset the negative substitution effects.
- $\frac{\partial z_f(\mathbf{p}^*)}{\partial p} < 0$  might not hold.
- So, we cannot be sure of uniqueness of WE.

# Gross Substitutes I

Suppose,

- There are two goods
- Consider three price vectors:  $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, p_2) = (2, 1)$ ,  $\mathbf{p}' = (p'_1, p'_2) = (3, 1)$  and  $\bar{\mathbf{p}} = (\bar{p}_1, \bar{p}_2) = (3, 2)$ .

Let,  $\mathbf{x}^i(\mathbf{p})$ , be the demand function for individual  $i$ .

## Question

*Suppose, the above goods are 'gross substitutes' for individual  $i$ .*

- *How will  $x_2^i(\mathbf{p}')$  compare with  $x_2^i(\mathbf{p})$ ?*
- *How will  $x_2^i(\bar{\mathbf{p}})$  compare with  $x_2^i(\mathbf{p})$ ?*
- Let  $\lambda = \max_j \left\{ \frac{\bar{p}_j}{p_j} \right\}$ ,  $j = 1, 2$ .
- Note here  $\lambda = \frac{\bar{p}_2}{p_2} = 2$

# Gross Substitutes II

- Also,  $\lambda \mathbf{p} \geq \bar{\mathbf{p}}$ . Since  $(4, 2) \geq (3, 2)$ .

## Question

*What can we say about the individual demand for the two goods at these two price vectors  $\lambda \mathbf{p} = (4, 2)$  and  $\bar{\mathbf{p}} = (3, 2)$ ?*

## Question

*What can we say about the individual demand for the two goods at the price vectors  $\mathbf{p} = (2, 1)$  and  $\lambda \mathbf{p} = (4, 2)$ ?*

## Gross Substitutes III

Next, consider two price vectors

- $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, p_2, p_3) = (3, 2, 1)$  and  $\bar{\mathbf{p}} = (\bar{p}_1, \bar{p}_2, \bar{p}_3) = (5, 1, 4)$

### Question

*What can we say about the excess demand at these two price vectors?*

- Let  $\lambda = \max_j \{ \frac{\bar{p}_j}{p_j} \}, j = 1, \dots, 3$ .
- Note here  $\lambda = \max \{ \frac{5}{3}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{4}{1} \} = \frac{\bar{p}_3}{p_3} = 4$
- Also,  $\lambda \mathbf{p} \geq \bar{\mathbf{p}}$ . Since  $(12, 8, 4) \geq (5, 1, 4)$ .

### Remark

$\mathbf{z}(\lambda \mathbf{p}) = \mathbf{z}(\mathbf{p})$ , i.e.,  $\mathbf{z}(4\mathbf{p}) = \mathbf{z}(\mathbf{p})$ .

# Gross Substitutes IV

Consider the following price vectors

- $\mathbf{p} = (p_1, p_2, p_3) = (3, 2, 1)$ ,  $\hat{\mathbf{p}} = (\hat{p}_1, \hat{p}_2, \hat{p}_3) = (12, 8, 4)$  and  $\bar{\mathbf{p}} = (\bar{p}_1, \bar{p}_2, \bar{p}_3) = (5, 1, 4)$ .

## Question

- *What can we say about the excess demand for 3rd good at prices  $\hat{\mathbf{p}}$  and  $\bar{\mathbf{p}}$ ? That is,*
- *How is  $z_3(\hat{\mathbf{p}})$  expected to compare with  $z_j(\bar{\mathbf{p}})$ ?*

Note:

- $\hat{\mathbf{p}} = \lambda \mathbf{p}$  and  $\hat{\mathbf{p}} \geq \bar{\mathbf{p}}$
- $\hat{p}_3 = \lambda p_3 = \bar{p}_3$ .