

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS  
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI

Subject: Common Pool of GE

Sem.: IV

Course & Code: Game Theory and Social Sciences ECON068

Duration (per week):

Date & Time 02/12/2024 at 11:00 AM

Venue: Online

Convenor: Anirban Kar, Soumendu Sarkar

College Teachers

Name	Affiliation and Contact Details
Dr Vijaya Rajni	College of Vocational Studies
Dr Anurag Kakkar	Hansraj College

The members present discussed and recommended the following

structure. **General Elective (GE 18) Game Theory and Social Sciences**

Semester	Course title and code	Credits	Duration (Per week)			Eligibility Criteria	Prerequisite
			Lecture	Tutorial	Practical / Practice		
IV/VI/ VI II	Game Theory and Social Sciences ECON068	4	3	1	0	Class XII	Math in Class XII

**Learning Objectives**

The Learning Objectives of this course are as follows:

- This course will teach the basic elements of game theory with applications to political science and other social sciences.
- It will cover simultaneous games, extensive-form games, repeated games, and spatial models of elections.
- The course will also focus on using the logic of games to make inferences and arguments about political and social behavior, with readings on collective action, voting, bargaining, repeated interaction, war, and other Final Examples.

### **Learning outcomes**

The Learning outcomes of this course are as follows:

- The students will learn how to apply multi-person decision making in an interactive setting.
- They will understand how to formulate different real-life situations as games and learn to predict the optimal strategies of players and how the players can exploit strategic situations for their own benefit.
- They will solve basic and intermediate games, including simultaneous-move and extensive form games, as well as basic games of asymmetric information.
- The students can create and solve an original model designed to understand a social or political problem of interest.

### **Syllabus**

UNIT I: Rational choice; interacting decision-makers; the normal/strategic form (9 hours)

UNIT II: Dominant and dominated strategies; iterated elimination of dominated strategies; dominance solvability; best response functions; Nash equilibrium. (15 hours)

UNIT III: Extensive-form and simultaneous game, Strategic game and its application in social sciences, electoral competition; the war of attrition, auctions; mixed strategies; finding mixed strategy equilibria; symmetric games and symmetric equilibria; illustrations: reporting a crime; expert diagnosis (15 hours)

UNIT IV: Strictly competitive equilibrium and maximization (6 hours)

Recommended readings

- Primary Readings:

Dixit, Avinash K., Susan Skeath, and David McAdams. *Games of Strategy* (5th edition).  
WW Norton & Company, 2020.

Prajit K. Dutta, *Strategies and games: theory and practice*. (2nd edition) MIT press 2022

- Secondary Reading: Martin J. Osborne, *An Introduction to Game Theory*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2004.

Note: Examination scheme and mode shall be as prescribed by the Examination Branch, University of Delhi, from time to time.

### **Sectionwise reading suggestions**

#### Unit I

DSM 1, 2

PD 1.1-1.3; 3.1-3.2 \*

MO 1.1-1.2; 2.1-2.5 \*

#### Unit II

DSM 4, 5, 7, 10

PD 3.3; 4.1-4.4; 5.1-5.4; (Chapter 6-7 optional) \*

MO 2.9; 2.8; 2.6-2.7; 3.1-3.2 \*

#### Unit III

DSM 3, 15.1-15.3, 16.5

PD 2.1-2.5; Chapter 8 (Chapter 9 in 2nd edition) \*

MO 5.2; 7.1; 3.3-3.5; 4.1-4.5; 4.6; 2.10; 4.7-4.8 \*

#### Unit IV

PD Chapter 10 (Chapter 11 in 2nd edition)

MO 11.1-11.3 \*

**\*Chapter-wise list of selected sections and exercises from Osborne:**

Chapter-2 :

2.7 Examples of Nash equilibrium

EXERCISE 25.1 (Altruistic players in the Prisoner's Dilemma)

EXERCISE 25.2 (Selfish and altruistic social behavior)

EXERCISE 28.1 (Variants of the Stag Hunt)

EXERCISE 31.1 (Contributing to a public good)

EXERCISE 32.2 (Voter participation)

EXERCISE 36.2 (Dividing money)

EXERCISE 40.1 (Finding Nash equilibria using best response functions) EXERCISE 40.2 (A joint project)

EXERCISE 45.2 (Strict equilibria and dominated actions)

EXERCISE 46.1 (Nash equilibrium and weakly dominated actions) 2.9.3 Illustration: voting

EXERCISE 47.1 (Voting)

2.10 Equilibrium in a single population: symmetric games and symmetric equilibria Chapter-3:

3.4 The War of Attrition

3.5 Auctions-3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3

EXERCISE 83.1 (Second-price sealed-bid auction with two bidders)

EXERCISE 84.1 (Nash equilibrium of first-price sealed-bid auction)

EXERCISE 85.1 (First-price sealed-bid auction)

Chapter-4: Mixed Strategy

#### 4.3.6 Example: BoS

EXERCISE 111.1 (Mixed strategy equilibria of Hawk–Dove)

EXERCISE 111.2 (Games with mixed strategy equilibria)

EXERCISE 112.1 (A coordination game)

EXERCISE 115.4 (Defending territory)

#### 4.8 Illustration: reporting a crime

\* These section are for reference for teachers only and no direct questions may be asked from these.