Centre for Development Economics
and
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Subversive Conversations
by
Archishman Chakraborty
Yeshiva University
Thursday, 26th September 2019 at 3:00 PM
Venue : Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
All are cordially invited
Abstract
A committee of two experts with common interests exchange messages in order to take a decision. An uninformed regulator has a conflict of interest with them, fully understands the intended meaning of all messages, and can overrule their decision. We identify conditions under which the committee can subvert the regulator’s agenda and implement the same committee-optimal decision rule that it would implement if it could communicate privately. Subversive communication takes the form of a back and forth conversation. Our results provide a theory of conversations based on plausible deniability in the face of possible public outrage.