Kyle Emerick (Tufts University)
Centre for Development Economics,
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
and
Institute of Economic Growth
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Motivated Information Agents and Technology Adoption in Agriculture
By
Kyle Emerick (Tufts University)
On Thursday, 17 September 2020 at 3:05 P.M.
Abstract
Information frictions limit the adoption of new agricultural technologies in developing countries. Most policy interventions seek ways of eliminating these frictions by targeting information treatments directly to selected farmers. We show that relying on supply-side agents, exploiting their business incentives to promote adoption, is more effective. Specifically, an information campaign targeted at private input suppliers makes them more likely to carry a new seed variety and ultimately increases farmer-level adoption by over 50 percent. These newly informed suppliers are proactive in informing potential customers and in increasing adoption by customers most in need of the technology. We show that they assume the role of private information agents in a long-term perspective of reputation building and business development.