Centre for Development Economics
and
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Tiered Housing Allocation:
An Experimental Analysis
by
Saurabh Singhal
University of Southern California
Thursday, August 30, 2012 at 3:00 p.m.
Venue : AMEX Conference Room (Second Floor)
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
All are cordially invited
Abstract
We study in the laboratory a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where (i) subjects are partitioned into tiers with hierarchical privileges, (ii) they play multiple matches, and (iii) they know their position in the priority queue before making their decision. In this environment, we evaluate the performance of the modi ed versions of three well-known mechanisms: Top Trading Cycle, Gale-Shapley and Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights. For all three mechanisms, we find low rates of participation (around 40%), high rates of truth-telling conditional on participation (around 90%) and significant efficiency losses. We show that position in the queue has a positive and significant impact on participation whereas experience and tier has little eff ect on behavior. Finally, the individual analysis reveals that the majority of subjects who do not play according to the theory still follow discernible patterns of participation and preference revelation.