Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
by
Swagata Bhattacharjee
(Jindal Global University)
(Wednesday, April 9, 2025, at 2:15 PM IST )
Venue: Amex Room
Abstract:-
We consider a static cheap talk model with either one or two senders in an environment where biases are privately known by the senders themselves. Before the senders learn the state, they send a cheap talk message about their bias to the receiver. Subsequently, the receiver chooses one sender to get state-relevant advice from. We ask two questions – One, is there an equilibrium where the senders’ bias is revealed? Two, is the bias revealing equilibrium welfare improving for the receiver? We find that when there is only one sender, there is no bias revealing equilibrium. However, if there are two senders, there exists a bias revealing equilibrium, and under some conditions, it gives the receiver more utility than any equilibrium which is possible without bias revelation. This highlights a new channel through which sender competition can benefit the receiver.