Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics


Is Nepotism Inevitable Under Search and Matching Friction?


Debojyoti Mazumdar
IIM, Indore


20th February 2019 (Wednesday) at 3:00 PM

Venue : Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

All are cordially invited
The present article develops a search and matching framework to model political nepotism in the job market. The model argues that labor market friction generates incentives for the political leaders to provide nepotism under a democratic setup. Both the leaders optimally choose nepotism when the labor market friction is higher. It is shown that even for a relatively lesser labor market friction at least one leader would always choose nepotism. The results of the basic model remain robust in an extension where followers can pay a price and choose their allegiance, to any one of the political parties.

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