Institute of Economic Growth
and
Centre for Development Economics,
Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Political Clientelism in West Bengal: Evidence and Budgetary Implications
By
Dilip Mookherjee (Boston University)
This is a joint work with Pranab Bardhan, Sandip Mitra, and Anusha Nath.
Friday, 8 January 2021 at 7:30 P.M IST
Abstract
This work provides a theory and empirical test for clientelism as distinguished from programmatic politics, based on how voters respond to delivery of private benefits versus local public goods. It further shows how program grants to GPs are manipulated by block and district officials depending on political competition and patterns of alignment of political control. In this context, we also address a policy question which examines to what extent pro-poor targeting would have improved if discretion of higher tiers over GP grants had been replaced by formula-based grants.
All are cordially invited.