Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Endogenous Transfers, Inequality and Conflict Intensity in a Network of Contesting Agents
28 July, Thursday at 3:05 PM
Venue: AMEX room
This paper aims to analyse endogenous transfers of “arms” between agents in a network, and the inter – dynamics between “transfer – susceptibility” or “transfer – resistance” of “arms” allocation vectors and the post – conflict Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) in terms of the “prize” which was being fought over. The second objective is to inspect the relationship between pre – conflict (arms) HHI & post – conflict (prize) HHI in a network of agents and how it varies with the network structure. Finally the paper tries to throw light on the trade off between conflict minimization and inequality in presence of a network of conflicting agents and proposes a lower bound inequality for a bipartite network if peace prevails.