Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics


On strategic candidacy games


Gopakumar Achuthankutty
Post-Doctoral Fellow CDE-IEG


18th April 2019 (Thursday) at 3:00 PM

Venue: Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

All are cordially invited

Outcomes of elections are not only influenced by the preferences of the voters but also by the preferences of the candidates. Motivated by this observation, Dutta et al. (2002) consider candidate stable voting rules i.e., voting rules that prevent candidates from strategically entering or exiting an election. These authors establish that only dictatorial voting rule satisfies this property if no restrictions are imposed on the admissible domain of preferences. This negative result more or less persists even when voting rules are required to satisfy other notions of equilibria in the underlying strategic candidacy game. However, these are ex-post incentive compatibility notions and hence, we explore whether an ex-ante notion of candidate stability leads to possibility results.


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