Centre for Development Economics
and
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondence
by
Ritesh Jain
(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
Thursday, February 6 2020 at 3:05 P.M.
Venue: New Seminar Room (Room no. 116, First Floor)
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
All are cordially invited
Abstract
A social choice correspondence (SCC) F is a mapping which associates with every state θ ∈ Θ is non empty subset of a set of outcomes. F is implementable in rationalizable strategies provided that there exists a mechanism such that for each state θ, the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes is equal to the socially desirable set F(θ). We find that r-monotonicity is a necessary condition for the rationalizable implementation of F. When there are at least three agents and F satisfies certain auxiliary conditions, r-monotonicity is also sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Finally, we show that a SCC which is never single-valued is rationalizably implementable if and only if it satisfies r-monotonicity.