Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics


Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondence


 Ritesh Jain

(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)

Thursday, February 6 2020 at 3:05 P.M.

Venue: New Seminar Room (Room no. 116, First Floor)

Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

All are cordially invited

A social choice correspondence (SCC) F is a mapping which associates with every state θ ∈ Θ is non empty subset of a set of outcomes. F is implementable in rationalizable strategies provided that there exists a mechanism such that for each state θ, the support of its set of rationalizable outcomes is equal to the socially desirable set F(θ). We find that r-monotonicity is a necessary condition for the rationalizable implementation of F. When there are at least three agents and F satisfies certain auxiliary conditions, r-monotonicity is also sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Finally, we show that a SCC which is never single-valued is rationalizably implementable if and only if it satisfies r-monotonicity.


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