Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics



Sequential Entry and Perfect Equilibrium


Ruhi Sonal (IIT Jodhpur)
Authors: Saptarshi Mukherjee (IIT Delhi) and Ruhi Sonal (IIT Jodhpur)

, 13 January 2022 at 3:05 PM IST.

We study a class of infinite horizon games in which agents enter the game in an exogenously given sequence. The outcome of the game is modeled as the formation of a network. We characterize the class of perfect equilibria in this setting and provide conditions under which behavioral phenomena such as “herding” occur. The setting and the results are applicable to the formation of networks on social media platforms and to the market for internships faced by medical and law school graduates.

Please find the link to the meeting below:


Meeting ID: 975 6046 3357
Passcode: 187914



All are cordially invited.

back to seminars…