Seminar by Salil Sharma, Princeton University

Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics

ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR

by

Venue: Amex Room

Abstract:-
Can institutions that promote the agency of players improve outcomes? We study this question in the context of the financing of multiple public goods through voluntary contributions. The players are motivated by self-interest: each player cares about the provision of a particular set of public goods and her contribution. However, individuals can deliberate and self-organize into groups. Based on insights from philosophy and social psychology, we assume that each such group can propose its preferred set of public goods along with its requisite contribution. Under an intuitive restriction on group stability, we find that this self-organization leads to efficient outcomes. At a broader level, the framework suggests that small changes to institutions that explicitly include active participation of stakeholders can lead to considerable gains.

All are cordially invited.

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