Seminar by Annika Lindskog (University of Gothenburg)

Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics

ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR

by

Venue: Room No. 205

Abstract:-
We explore the ability of conditional cash transfer programs to reduce child marriages in the presence of heterogeneous social norms.  Contrary to popular belief, we show that  strong child marriage norms can sometimes exhibit larger program effects for a given transfer than  weak norms. This happens because strong norms result in a large number of households marrying below their preferred age. Transfers allow these households to follow their laissez-faire preferences. We empirically explore this relationship between norms and transfers by combining household data reflecting marriage ages with administrative data on one of the earliest and largest programs to reduce child marriage in North India.  Consistent with our theoretical results, we find that regions and households with strong early marriage norms exhibit larger effects. Our paper shows that the ability of modest financial incentives to influence  norms  depends on the particular configuration of  parameters related to norms and  laws relative to household preferences. It is not therefore surprising that attempts to  aim to change culturally-driven behavior through  transfers have had mixed success.

All are cordially invited.

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