Seminar by Szilvia Papai (Concordia University)

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Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics

ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR

Strategyproof Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Agent Preferences

by

Szilvia Papai
(Concordia University)
 

 (Tuesday, February 24, 2026, at 2:00 PM IST )


Venue:  Room No. 116

Abstract:-
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents have dichotomous preferences and the other side has strict preferences or priorities. We present a new mechanism that satisfies many desirable properties, including individually rationality, maximum size, stability, Pareto-efficiency on both sides, and strategyproofness for agents.

All are cordially invited.
 
 
 

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