Centre for Development Economics
and
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes
By
Amrita Dhillon (King’s College, London)
Thursday, 5 November 2020 at 3:05 P.M.
Abstract
Recent developments in blockchain technology have made possible greater progress on secure electronic voting, opening the way to better ways of voting. In this paper, we formalize the features of “liquid democracy” which allows voters to delegate their votes to other voters. In such a setting, what happens to information aggregation with simple majority voting? We show that in contrast to the seminal work by Federsen and Pesendorfer 1997, delegation can weakly improve information aggregation in finite elections with and without private information. In the large elections case, we show the existence of an equilibrium in undominated strategies that aggregates information. Delegation offers simpler ways for independent uninformed voters to coordinate on the “correct” outcome