Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination
by
Rohan Dutta
(McGill University)
with
Leonie Baumann
(Thursday, September 4, 2025, at 3:10 PM, IST )
Venue: Amex Room
Abstract:-
A group of agents with ex-ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbours), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbours (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent’s ex-ante winning probability is monotone in degree. All equilibria that satisfy some robustness criteria lie between this adversarial disclosure equilibrium and a less informative one that features no-snitching and no discrimination.