Seminar by Komal Malik (Shiv Nadar University )

Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics

ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR

by

Venue:  Amex

Abstract:-
We analyse security design in an environment with common value and proprietary information with one bidder – informed bidder, bringing in the asymmetry among bidders. We show that when the seller restricts bidding to an ordered set of securities in First Price auction, the informed bidder bids more aggressively. In the informal auction (pay-as-bid), we characterise the equilibrium bidding and show that in any equilibrium, the uninformed bidder always bids in steepest security, that is, offers loan to the seller. Our results have direct applications for several “informal” markets such as start-up financing in later rounds, mineral rights auction etc.

All are cordially invited.

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