Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Popularity and Student Networks: Trade-offs in Resolving Social Isolation through Deskmate Assignments
by
Palaash Bhargava
(Max Planck Institute)
(Friday, September 25, 2026 at 1:30 PM)
Venue: Room No.107
Abstract:-
How should peer matching interventions incorporate equilibrium effects? I study this question in the context of social isolation among Indian school students. Social connections are central to educational, socio-emotional, and long-run labor market outcomes. Using data on 12,842 students, I first document that relatively isolated students face substantial academic and socio-emotional disadvantages. I then implement a two-tier randomized deskmate matching intervention, aimed at improving the outcomes of these isolated students. The results reveal a trade-off between local and general equilibrium effects. At the individual level, matching isolated students with each other improves their social connections, classroom experiences, and non-cognitive skills. In contrast, at the classroom level, deskmate plans that pair a majority of isolated students with popular peers increase overall social integration but generate no corresponding gains in socio-emotional skills or classroom experiences. To explain these patterns, I develop a model of network formation in which returns to social effort depend on endogenous peer interactions and sociological forces such as social comparisons and proximity effects. Consistent with the empirical findings, the model shows that outcomes for isolated students depend on both their immediate deskmate and the overall composi- tion of matches, with negative externalities from pairing isolated students together emerging beyond a specific threshold. Optimal peer matching must therefore weigh local against general equilibrium effects, which may move in opposite directions, giving rise to equity-efficiency trade-offs.