Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics

Delhi School of Economics

ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR

Global Stability of Coordination under Monotone Sampling

by

Srinivas Arigapudi
(IIT Kanpur)

 

 (Thursday, October 15, 2026 at 3:00 PM)


Venue:  Amex Room

Abstract:-
 We study coordination in multi-population environments where agents revise actions after observing finite independent samples of others’ behavior and applying deterministic monotone decision rules. The framework covers a broad class of commonly studied learning dynamics, and it allows heterogeneity across populations. Except for the knife-edge case in which every population simply copies one sampled action, coordination is globally stable: almost every trajectory converges to a coordinated state in which everyone chooses the same action. The proof connects monotone sampling rules to reliability functions of coherent systems. We show that relaxing independence, monotonicity, or within-population homogeneity can generate stable miscoordination.

 

All are cordially invited.
 
 
 

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