Centre for Development Economics
and
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR

Competing Under Uncertainty

by

Ram Singh

Department of Economics, University of Delhi

Thursday,  16th October 2014 at 3:00 PM

Venue : Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

All are cordially invited
Abstract

Many a time individuals and firms compete with one another under uncertainty about the outcome. Examples include firms and advertising agencies competing for market share, R&D firms competing for patents, litigants competing for a favorable court award, politicians contesting elections, among others. In such situations, the probability of success depends on the efforts put in by the contestants and also on the nature of the underlying uncertainty. Moreover, the contest can be asymmetric in terms of the competing strength of the players as well as in terms of the information available to them. We examine equilibria for asymmetric contests, under different kinds of underlying uncertainty. Further, we analyze the implications of the asymmetry for the equilibrium choice of efforts by the players, the probability of success, and the payoffs. We show that asymmetry of the contest results in disproportionately large payoffs for the stronger players.  Several types of the hitherto unexamined uncertainty as well as the asymmetry of the contests are covered.

 

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