Seminar by Devasmita Jena (Madras School of Economics)

Success of economic sanctions hinges on their impact on sanctioned countries’ trade. This, in turn, depends on the sanctioned country’s opportunity to divert trade to a third-party (country, not involved in sanctions). History is witness to third-parties facilitating trade diversion, thus busting sanction. Nonetheless, literature does not present conclusive evidence on trade diversion or on motivation for busting sanctions. Therefore, in this paper, we address the following. What bearing sanctions have on bilateral trade flows and trade diversion? Is diversion dependent on the political and trade alliance the third-party shares with the sanctioned and/or the sanctioning countries? We estimate a structural gravity model for globally representative country-dyads, during 1990-2019, using, inter-alia the Global Sanctions Database. We find that sanctions depress bilateral trade between sanctioned and sanctioning nations and cause trade diversion via third-party. The existence of trade alliance between third party country and country involved in sanction has additional impact on trade diversion. Furthermore, a political alliance between third-party and sanctioned country heightens trade between them, amidst sanction. However, political alliance between third-party and sanctioning country doesn’t explain trade between them. Our results have insight for India’s evolving trade relations with Russia, since 2022, as Russia reels under Western sanctions.