Centre for Development Economics
and
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR

Community contracts : An experimental investigation of rule formation in Indian villages

by

Rohini Somanathan

Centre for Development Economics and Department of Economics, (DSE)

Thursday,  30th October 2014 at 3:00 PM

Venue : Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

All are cordially invited
Abstract

Can the nature of the social interactions in communities prevent them  from seizing opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation? To investigate this question, we invented  the social contracting game,  in which players vote on a rule which requires a  minimum contribution to the public good and can monitor and punish non-compliers. We solve for the unique equilibrium in the social contracting game and use experimental and survey data from 24 villages in Uttar Pradesh to compare experimental and equilibrium outcomes. We find that villages that set more efficient rules are also those in which there is greater communal harmony and trust and in which government programs are reported to work better.

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