Seminar by Anmol Ratan (Waseda University)
Centre for Development Economics
Department of Economics
Delhi School of Economics
ANNOUNCE A SEMINAR
Tests of Distributional outcomes in (field) Double Auction markets
by
Anmol Ratan
(Waseda University)
(Thursday, July 30, 2026, at 3:05 PM )
Venue: AMEX
Abstract:-
The seminar examines inequality in market outcomes using experimental data from Bulte et al. (2017). Motivated by growing concerns over the distributional consequences of markets (Bernanke 2007; Stiglitz 2012; Piketty 1997, 2014), the study draws on lab-in-the-field experiments conducted in Sierra Leone, in which participants traded through double-sided oral auctions. The design allows comparison of the distribution of profits (welfare gains) generated by trade with respect to the predictions of the competitive equilibrium (CE). Participants were assigned to trade within their own village, across villages, or through middlemen — with middlemen either identifiable or anonymous — enabling systematic comparison of how market structure shapes distributional outcomes.
The study addresses two key questions:
- How does the dispersion of profits observed under each form of market organization compare to those predicted by the CE benchmark?
- What explains the differences in inequality (in dispersion of profits) across these market structures?
Results. The analysis yields four findings. First, inequality is lower when trade takes place across villages than when it is confined within a village. Second, inequality under direct trade — whether within or across villages — is lower than under middlemen-mediated trade, suggesting that intermediation exacerbates distributional disparities. Third, among the intermediated markets, inequality is lower when middlemen are identifiable than when they are anonymous. Fourth, the gap between observed inequality and the competitive equilibrium prediction is narrowest under inter-village trade.