MIEG Part B Reading list

By On · Add Comment

MIEG 2016
Reading List
Game Theory PART-2: Games of Incomplete Information

1. Imperfect information and Subgame perfection
Information Set
Mixed and behavioural strategies
FT Pages 83-85, 87-90, 92-96 and Chapter 5 pages 145-160.
Gibbons Chapter 2.

2. Static games of incomplete information
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Bayesian Cournot game
Entry game
Harsanyi Transformation
Gibbons Chapter 3, pages 143-152
FT Chapter 6 pages 209-216.
Using Bayesian games to justify mixed strategy equilibrium
Gibbons pages 152-154
FT page 230.
Auction theory: First price, second price sealed bids and revenue calculation.
Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, 2002, pages 1-7 and 13-26.

3. Dynamic games of incomplete information
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Signaling games: basic structure
Application: Two period reputation game (FT pages 321-323 and 326-329)

Application: Corporate investment problem
Gibbons Chapter 4 (pages 173-207)
Chain store paradox and reputation effect (FT pages 367-374, Section 9.2.1)
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium – “Intuitive Criterion” (Gibbons Chapter 4 pages 233-244)

4. Information Economics
Adverse selection
Principal-Agent problem
Monopolistic Screening: Example of Share Tenancy (Debraj Ray, (1999), Development Economics, OUP, pages 474-478.)
Competitive Screening model (MWG Chapter 13)
Signaling : Spence’s job market signaling (Gibbons Chapter 4)
Moral hazard (MWG Chapter 14 pages 477-488).

References
Gibbons, R., A Primer in Game Theory.
FT: Fudenberg and Tirole , Game Theory.
Vijay Krishna , Auction Theory, 2002
MWG: Mas-Colell, A., M Whinston, and J. Green (1995), Advanced Microeconomic Theory.

Share →